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Claiming Thomas Jefferson: 
The Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian Genesis of American Progressivism 
 
Paul Joseph Krause 
Baldwin Wallace University 
 
“Thomas Jefferson, author of America.” These are the titular words that Christopher 
Hitchens used to describe America’s third President and author of the Declaration of 
Independence.1  Indeed, Thomas Jefferson invokes much emotion, praise, and criticism from 
devotees, biographers, historians, political theorists, and everyday Americans.  As the author of 
the famous words “all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights,” Thomas Jefferson continues to serve as  a model of inspiration for the 
defense of liberty and the promise to create a more perfect union. 
 While George Washington is considered to be the “Father of our Country” due to his 
leadership roles in the American Revolution and  presidency, Thomas Jefferson  was the “Author 
of America” and one of the most well-known Founding Fathers.  And even though Jefferson’s 
rural and agrarian republic has since transformed into an industrious, commercial, and urban 
democracy, Jeffersonian idealism continues to animate American politics.  Of the Founding 
Fathers, Jefferson was one of the few democrats—actual proponents of popular democracy and 
firm believers that the common  people could, and should, rule themselves independent of the 
directives of intellectuals, bankers, and a monolithic federal government.  Jefferson was “a man 
                                                          
1 Christopher Hitchens, Thomas Jefferson: Author of America (New York: HarperCollins, 2005). 
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of truly revolutionary and democratic temperament” compared to his more reserved 
contemporaries.2   
 But where does the Jeffersonian legacy stand today?  In 1935, Charles Wiltse in The 
Jeffersonian Tradition in American Democracy traced the evolution of Jeffersonian democracy 
through  the progressive politics of the New Deal, arguing that American progressivism had two 
unique strands, one stemming from Hamilton and the other from Jefferson.3 While Jefferson’s 
close connection to the politics of American liberalism seems unquestionable, contemporary 
conservatives and libertarians also extol Thomas Jefferson and claim him as their own.4  This 
revisionism has little merit as Thomas Jefferson was a thorough progressivist and not remotely 
conservative in any sense.5  Jefferson also remains a favorite among American liberals, at least 
for the foundational principles contained in Jefferson’s philosophy concerning popular 
democracy and by logical extension, universal rights.6  In contrast, conservatives have grown to 
remake the liberal Jefferson into a conservative defender of limited government and guardian of 
individual liberty.  Everyone in America still seeks to claim Thomas Jefferson as  his or her own, 
in some way, shape, or form. 
 
Thomas Jefferson and the Populist Tradition 
                                                          
2 Hitchens, 188. 
3 Charles Wiltse, The Jeffersonian Tradition in American Democracy (New York: Hill and Wang, Inc., 1960 
reprint), 261-267, 255. See also, Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Vintage Books, 1955). 
3 See, in particular, Thomas DiBacco, “Thomas Jefferson, Democrats’ Favorite Conservative,” Washington Times, 
April 15, 2013; Clyde Wilson, “Thomas Jefferson, Conservative,” review of The Sage of Monticello by Dumas 
Malone, The Imaginative Conservative, April 19, 2012; and David Barton, The Jefferson Lies: Exposing the Myths 
You’ve Always Believed about Thomas Jefferson (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Inc., 2012). 
 
5 M. Andrew Holowchak, Thomas Jefferson: Uncovering his Unique Philosophy and Vision (New York: 
Prometheus Books, 2014), 59-129. 
6 Merrill Peterson, “Afterward,” in Jeffersonian Legacies, ed. Peter Onuf (Charlottesville: University of Virginia 
Press, 1993), 464. 
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Jeffersonian liberalism can be described as a form of liberal populism.    The promotion of the 
common worker over the privileged forces of wealth, capital, and establishment is  Jefferson’s 
longstanding legacy within American liberalism.7  The Democratic Party, which is the loose 
inheritor of the Jeffersonian democratic tradition, has long since promoted its lineage as “the 
party of the working-class.”  Jeffersonian democracy reached new heights with the first formal 
Democratic president, Andrew Jackson.  The populist tradition’s democratic impulses were 
keenly analyzed and realized by Alexis de Tocqueville when he visited the United States.  It was 
in the town, the “democracy of the township,” where the vibrancy of democracy could be found; 
“In the township, as well as everywhere else, the people is the only source of power; but in no 
stage of government does the body of citizens exercise a more immediate influence.”8  These 
decentralized democracies, or “ward republics” according to Jefferson, would be the salvation of 
the democratic spirit of the United States.9  Furthermore, Jefferson’s commitment to local 
democratic government instead of a larger federal government was a means by which to prevent 
the corrupting rise of big business and big capital and to preserve democratic individualism.  
Jefferson’s close identification with the commoner  was the bedrock of his liberalism. 
 The strong promotion of townships and democratic individualism represented  the 
prevailing spirit of liberalism and proto-progressivism in early American history.  Democracy 
naturally oriented itself towards attitudes of progress and equality, to the extent that the 1908 
Republican Party platform charged “that the trend of democracy is towards socialism.”10  In 
contrast to the apparent evolution of Jeffersonian liberalism towards a sort of Jeffersonian 
                                                          
7 For a fuller introduction to Jefferson’s tacit anti-capitalism, see Claudio J. Katz, “Thomas Jefferson’s 
Anticapitalism,” American Journal of Political Science 47, no. 1 (2003): 1-17. 
8 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Bantam Dell, 2000 reprint), 68-69. 
9 Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, in Jefferson: Autobiography, Notes on the State of Virginia, 
Public and Private Papers, Addresses, and Letters, ed. Merrill Peterson (New York: Library of America, 1984), 
1399. 
10 Wiltse, 257. 
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socialism,11 the Republican Party and the defenders of American republicanism counter-claimed 
that republicanism would safeguard against not only the destruction of wealth but also the abuses 
of wealth and moreover, provide for an equal right to earn instead of an equal right to take.12  
The democratic spirit naturally tended towards opposition to privilege, wealth, and power, 
however, and  was a direct legacy from Jeffersonian philosophy. 
 The philosophy of Alexander Hamilton  stood in clear opposition to the liberal populism 
of Thomas Jefferson.  Hamilton, as  the progenitor of a conservative and nationalist tradition in  
opposition to Jefferson’s liberalism and internationalism, was a staunch Federalist and like many 
of his fellow members of this “aristocratic party,” 13 was anti-democratic.  Although the wealthy 
elite and natural aristocrats may have shown enthusiasm for democratic institutions, their support  
was largely superficial.  Their endorsement of democratic institutions and democratic reform  
was not from a love for the spirit of democracy but rather,  a means to protect their status in an 
emerging egalitarian society.  In Tocqueville’s words, “[B]eneath this artificial enthusiasm, and 
these obsequious attentions to the preponderating power, it is easy to perceive that the wealthy 
members of the community entertain a hearty distaste to the democratic institutions of their 
country.  The populace is at once the object of their scorn and fear.”14  The democratic populace 
was the object of natural fear and suspicion from the upper classes because of the commoners’ 
material-driven quest for equality that was naturally embedded and fostered within them through 
the democratic process. 
                                                          
11 See Jim Bissett, Agrarian Socialism in America: Marx, Jefferson, and Jesus in the Oklahoma Countryside, 1904-
1920 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999). 
12 Edward Randolph Hartman, Socialism Versus Christianity (New York: Cochrane Publishing, 1909), 257. 
13 Tocqueville, 206. 
14 Ibid., 207. 
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After all, it was Thomas Jefferson, upon witnessing the revolution in France, who 
declared in a 1789  letter to James Madison that “the earth belongs in usufruct to the living; [and] 
the dead have neither powers nor rights over it.”15  Likewise, he shared similar sentiments in his 
letter to Samuel Kercheval: “This corporeal globe, and everything upon it, belong to its present 
corporeal inhabits, during their generation.  They alone have a right to direct what is the concern 
of themselves alone.”16  The democratic spirit of Jefferson was truly radical and risked, in 
Hamilton’s and his supporters’ eyes, the destruction of the natural talent of the emerging 
meritocratic class (the “natural aristocracy”) in America.  All told, what is considered the 
conservative tradition in America,17 Hamiltonianism,  was implicitly Hobbesian in its 
philosophical outlook concerning the nature of humanity and further,  was deeply federalist.18  
But in being deeply federalist, the philosophy was also strongly anti-democratic.  And the trend 
of the American nation  was away from republicanism and towards democracy, which  
perpetuated the conflict between Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian philosophy.  Indeed, the main 
storyline of America has long been cast in this struggle between Jeffersonian democracy and 
Hamiltonian natural aristocracy.19  It was only after the rise of progressivism and the merger of 
Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian ideas that the near 150 year narrative of the struggle between 
Jefferson and Hamilton subsided. 
                                                          
15 Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, September 6, 1789, in Jefferson, 959. 
16 Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816. 
17 Louis Hartz’s The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1955) asserts that 
there is no authentic form of American conservatism akin to the conservatism found in Europe.  Rather, America is 
an inherently liberal country, and conservatism serves to stand as an orphan of sorts in American culture.  It was not  
until the rise of “movement conservatism” in post-war (World War II) America that a modern right-wing 
conservative political movement was founded.  The later thesis is that of George Nash, The Conservative 
Intellectual Movement in America since 1945 (Wilmington: ISI, 1996 reprint). 
18 Holowchak, 99. 
19 Joseph Ellis, American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 8. 
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 Therefore, the heart of the populist tradition can be seen as the struggle of the under class 
against the natural aristocracy, or upper classes.20  Part of the philosophy of westward expansion 
started by Thomas Jefferson as governor of Virginia during the American Revolution, his 
purchase of the Louisiana Territory as President, and the succeeding waves of westward 
expansion culminating in the Mexican-American War under President James Polk, was founded 
in the twin beliefs of the westward progress of civilization and the fear that urban financiers from 
the corrupt metropolis would destroy the virgin lands of the west.21  Westward expansion was 
another means of  advancing the populist and democratic nature of the American republic; the 
western lands would be fertile territory for the yeoman farmer, whom Jefferson called “ the 
chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen people, whose breasts he has made his peculiar 
deposit for substantial and genuine virtue.”22  Thus, westward expansion ensured both the 
expansion of democratic virtue that was innately tied to the yeoman laborer,  as well as the next 
geographic region for the expansion of democracy.23  It was the lands gained, primarily in the 
Louisiana Purchase during Jefferson’s Presidency, that would later be the  site for the last great 
mass democratic movement in American history—the “Agrarian Revolt.”24 
 Of course, this entire populist tradition stood  on several key foundations.  First was  
opposition to the excess of corporate capitalism, of which Jefferson and his liberal co-heirs and 
successors were always extremely wary and vigilant  during their terms as president.25  Second 
                                                          
20 Ibid. 
21 Peter Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire: The Language of American Nationhood (Charlottesville: University of Virginia 
Press, 2000), 33-37. 
22 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, Query XIX—Manufactures, in Jefferson, 290. 
23 Frederick Jackson Turner’s seminal essay, “The Significance of the Frontier in  American History” (1893) 
articulates one of the more recognizable claims of the western frontier, and the frontier pioneers’ and  yeoman 
farmers’ influence upon the direction and formation of American democracy. 
24 For a fuller treatise on the populist uprising, see Lawrence Goodwyn, The Populist Movement: A Short History of 
the Agrarian Revolt in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). 
25 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., “What is Loyalty?  A Difficult Question,” New York Times, November 2, 1947. 
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was  a commitment to popular, or majoritarian, democracy.  Third was  a philosophy of 
communitarian localism that emphasized the democracy of the locality above that of the federal 
government and that was  closely tied to the principles of popular democracy.  Fourth was  the 
ever obvious commitment and promotion of individual liberty.  The tacit anti-capitalism of 
Thomas Jefferson is something that most libertarians and political conservatives seem to omit 
from their extolment of Jefferson, even when Jefferson is rightly identified with liberal populism 
(although contemporary “libertarian populism” infuses elements of populism with free-market 
capitalism, thus only being half-Jeffersonian at best).26  It  was from among these planks that 
Jeffersonian populism rested  and from which  the contemporary Left and Right seek to create 
platforms that often conflict with their otherwise anti-Jeffersonian political positions.  
Furthermore, despite Jefferson’s progressive philosophy, his static economic philosophy was  a 
major concern for American liberals  by the turn of the twentieth century.  Indeed, the inability 
of Jefferson to articulate any sort of philosophy for  the rise of an industrial, commercial, and 
urban America  was the problem that  prompted the birth of American Progressivism. 
 
Hamilton’s America and the Rise of Progressivism 
 
 In contrast to Jefferson’s agrarian and populist democracy stood Alexander Hamilton’s 
vision of a nationalistic, centralized, and economically industrious United States guided by the 
rule of the natural aristocracy.27  The nexus of power in Hamilton’s perspective would 
necessarily have been in urban centers and along the commercially-minded and industrial 
                                                          
26 Jay Cost, “The New Old Thing: Jeffersonian Populism Returns,” Weekly Standard, Vol. 18, No. 46, August 19, 
2013. 
27 Holowchak, 12, 92-93. 
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Northeast.28  Whereas Jefferson had looked to the yeoman farmer and laborer for inspiration for 
the new American political project, Hamilton started the conservative tradition’s emulation of 
the British system as the foundational guide for America.29  For Hamilton, it was imperative that 
the United States become an economic, commercial, and industrial power modeled after the very 
system that the Americans had rebelled against, in order to achieve their own independence.  In 
addition, Hamilton held a distrustful view of the majority, and his conception of democracy was 
far from the optimistic and populist vision endorsed by his rival Thomas Jefferson.30  While 
Jefferson  was able to lay some of the foundations for his vision as Washington’s Secretary of 
State,31 the Jeffersonian Revolution of 1800 and the subsequent Democratic domination of 
American politics kept the rise of Hamilton’s America at bay until the rise of the modern 
Republican Party and the resulting American Civil War that nearly ruined the United States 
between 1861-1865. 
 Thus, Jefferson’s agrarian empire of liberty was eclipsed after the American Civil War 
and the rapid industrialization of the United States, and this industrialization and urbanization 
was largely centered in the north rather than the south and west.32  The modern Republican Party, 
despite the claims of contemporary revisionists as having been “a liberal party” at its foundation, 
was philosophically conservative, nationalist, protectionist and Hamiltonian in its founding.33  
Identifying the “old” Republican and Democratic Parties based on late twentieth and twenty-first 
                                                          
28 Ibid., 93; Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1989), 19. 
29 Jennifer Clark, “Anglophilia,” in Britain and the Americas: Culture, Politics, and History, eds. Will Kaufman and 
Heidi McPherson, (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, Inc., 2005), 84-87. 
30 Holowchak, 95. 
31 Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It, 42-43. 
32 Ellis, 352. 
33 Rich Rubino, “Democratic and Republican Ideologies Undergo Dramatic Role Reversal,” Huffington Post, June 
13, 2013.  Rich Rubino’s article is one of many contemporary articles that grossly misrepresent the Democratic 
Party as being conservative and the Republican Party as being liberal upon their foundations, and “swapped” 
ideological positions, primarily following the Civil Rights Movement. 
34






century social politics does great injustice to the philosophical and metaphysical foundations 
upon which Hamiltonianism and Jeffersonianism rested.   
 By the end of the Gilded Age, during the height of rapid industrialization, a new problem 
faced the United States—the concentration of wealth and power among the corporate and 
“natural” upper classes. What Jefferson had feared, the rise of an urban, commercial, and 
capitalist America, finally came to fruition.  Jefferson had long believed that the rise of big 
business and big government would lead to a natural alliance that would subvert the interests of 
the common American and restructure democracy to favor the elite, rather than the working-class 
majority.  The wealth and power amassed by a few, coupled with the growing material inequality 
between rich and poor,  was what first prompted the Agrarian Revolt and populist uprisings that 
led to the formation of the Greenback Party, Populist Party, free silver movement, and the 
nomination of William Jennings Bryan—an heir to the agrarian, Jeffersonian, and popular 
democratic tradition—as the Democratic Party’s nominee for President three times in four 
election cycles.34  The populist agrarian uprising has been characterized as “the largest 
democratic mass movement in American history” and was unmistakably Jeffersonian in its 
political orientation.35 
William Jennings Bryan, aware of the stage upon which he spoke in 1896, explicitly cast 
his lot  with Jefferson than with the forces of big business and capital: “I stand with Jefferson, 
rather than with them (speaking of the corporate business classes), and tell them, as he did, that 
the issue of money is a function of government, and that the banks ought to go out of the 
governing business.”36  However, the failures of the populist revolt, which Wiltse characterized 
                                                          
34 Wiltse, 251-255. 
35 Goodwyn, vii. 
36 William Jennings Bryan, “Cross of Gold,” (Speech given at Democratic National Convention, Chicago, Illinois, 
July 9, 1896). 
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as being “agrarian and proletarian” in the tradition of Jeffersonian liberalism,37 gave way to the 
rise of progressivism, or modern liberalism.  Yet progressivism also subverted the liberal 
populist tradition.  Although progressivism came to inherit some characteristics of the liberal 
populist tradition, the largely urban middle-class movement exhibited what Friedrich Nietzsche 
and Oswald Spengler called the “transvaluation of values.”38  That is, the transition from rural 
working-class agrarian populism to urban middle-class progressivism would naturally lead to the 
urban progressive movement exhibiting strong opposition to, and a rejection of, many of the 
values and principles subscribed to by the rural, agrarian, liberal populists. 
 The failure of the agrarian revolt was a matter of geography, coupled with an unflinching 
commitment to Jeffersonian ideology.  Contained in the south and west, although having 
exceedingly high support in these regions, the movement failed to spread nationally.  Primarily 
the concern of farmers, poor laborers, and other underclass and predominately rural and agrarian 
artisans, their concerns never struck a strong chord with those Americans living in the industrial 
and urban Midwest, or the commercial and urban Northeast.  However, the great legacy of the 
Agrarian Revolt was in how its participants sought to confront the growing inequality and 
concentration of wealth and power—through democracy itself.39  Like  the underpinning of 
Jeffersonian democracy, the populist and agrarian liberals, despite suffering from their own self-
defeating racism, advocated for greater democratic reform as a means of  battling the “walls of 
privilege” that were falling upon them.40   
                                                          
37 Wiltse, 251. 
38 Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West: An Abridged Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 181. 
39 Wiltse, 253. 
40 “Walls of Privilege” is a reference to the phrase used by Woodrow Wilson in his “New Freedom” Platform, which 
attacked the “Triple Wall of Privilege:” banks, tariffs, and trusts—three of the principle targets for the agrarian 
liberals in the late nineteenth century.  See U.S. History: Pre-Columbian to the New Millennium, “Woodrow 
Wilson’s New Freedom,” UShistory.org, http://www.ushistory.org/us/43g.asp. 
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The democratic impulse of the Agrarian Revolt was again foretold by Alexis de 
Tocqueville, who commented that democratic nations are naturally bred to see the perfectibility 
of humanity and strive for absolute equality without the restraints of natural aristocracy, nobility, 
and state religion (the natural privileged classes).41  Furthermore, this populist uprising can be 
seen as the next progression towards equality that Tocqueville saw as being inherent and 
imbedded in the notions of democracy:  “I think that democratic communities have a natural 
taste for freedom…But for equality, their passion is ardent, insatiable, incessant, invincible.”42  
That ardent and insatiable passion for equality prompted the populist revolt to counter the 
newfound disparity of division, wealth, and power segregation that had emerged after the Gilded 
Age:  “Democratic nations are at times fond of equality, but there are certain epochs at which the 
passion they entertain for it swells to the height of fury.”43  That fury was exhibited by the mass 
revolution of farmers and poor laborers at the excesses of government and corporate capital at 
the end of the nineteenth century.  But the failure of the Agrarian Revolt did not go unnoticed,  
nor was it left without a legacy.  After another failed Presidential bid by William Jennings Bryan 
in 1900, signaling the  death knell of the populist movement, the progressives arose and 
synthesized several major tenets of populism, with modified aspects of Hamiltonian philosophy, 
to beget progressivism.  Progressivism,  though a larger venue in which some populist causes 
were ultimately adopted, was still a largely urban and middle-class movement that prioritized 
urban problems over those  of the rural countryside. 
 These turn of the century progressives addressed rising inequality through a revision of 
Hamiltonian governmental and economic philosophy with the combination of Jeffersonian 
                                                          
41 Tocqueville, 543-545. 
42 Ibid., 617. 
43 Ibid., 616. 
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democratic politics.  As Herbert Croly bluntly stated, “We must begin, consequently, with 
critical accounts of the ideas of both Jefferson and of Hamilton; and we must seek to discover 
wherein each of these sets of ideas was right, and wherein each was wrong.”44  Croly, however, 
did  not hide the fact that he sided with the conservative and nationalist outlook of Hamilton over 
the misguided “amiable enthusiasm” of Thomas Jefferson: “I shall not disguise the fact that, on 
the whole, my own preferences are on the side of Hamilton rather than of Jefferson.”45  For 
Croly, the redeeming aspects of Jefferson were found not only in his unwavering faith in the 
commoner—even if Croly himself saw this as somewhat naïve—but also in the implicit calls for 
democracy and universal rights contained in Jefferson’s writings.  For the progressives, the 
democratization of America would ultimately bring about its salvation from the concentration of 
wealth and power.  While Croly favored the nationalized economic and governmental policies of 
Hamilton, he was acutely aware that Hamilton’s greatest fault was his anti-democratic federalism 
that was “inimical to democracy.”46  For Croly and other progressives sympathetic to the realism 
of Hamilton, overturning this anti-democratic tendency was their primary goal. 
As the founder of the New Republic magazine, and a leading public intellectual who is 
extolled by the Center for American Progress,47 Croly, in siding with Hamilton over Jefferson,  
inevitably cast the Hamiltonian shadow over progressivism.  Contrary to popular belief , 
progressivism was not a leftward shift in American politics; it was a centrist shift by urban 
intellectuals who were sympathetic to Jeffersonian ideas of democracy and equality but who 
rejected his seemingly infantile views of government, capital, and fantasy ideal of an agrarian 
                                                          
44 Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life (New York: The MacMillon Company, 1911), 29. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 41-42. 
47John Halpin and Conor P. Williams, The Progressive Intellectual Tradition in America, (Washington D.C.: Center 
for American Progress, April 2010), 1-18. 
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nation.  For these mostly urban intellectuals, the prior Agrarian Revolt failed because it was too 
liberal, too Jeffersonian, and with the rise of an urban and industrious America—the very 
America that Jefferson sought to avoid—a pure commitment to Jeffersonian liberalism would 
never (re)gain acceptance in the new America.  Therefore, the redeeming aspects of Jeffersonian 
liberalism had to be synthesized with the realities of an urban and industrial (Hamiltonian) 
America.  Compared to the Jefferson-Jackson-Bryan fear of corporate interests, Croly and other 
progressives believed that large corporate interests, if “tamed,” could be utilized for the benefit 
of the entire nation.48      
 As John Halpin and Conor P. Williams rightly point out, progressivism also amended 
aspects of Hamiltonianism.  Economically, these reforms to Hamiltonian philosophy sought to 
achieve “[a] counterbalance [to] the excessive power of business and to fight inequality.”49  
Additionally, in contrast to Jefferson, the progressives also agreed with Hamilton with regards to 
governmental policy as the primary means to achieve the fight against inequality, which  
indicates a new common ground found among modern liberals and the progenitors of 
conservatism in the United States.50  But whereas Jefferson was committed to a decentralized 
democracy, Hamilton supported the notions of a strong and activist federal government that 
would not only help promote the interests of corporate business in America but also “balance” 
this promotion of government and business through the establishment of public welfare.  In the 
Hamiltonian program, a strong federal government, acting in unison with strong corporate 
business interests, could  work together not only for their mutual benefit but also for the benefit 
of the collective whole.51  However, the growing reliance upon a Hamiltonian order and 
                                                          
48 Ibid., 8. 
49 Ibid., 1. 
50 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and Russell Kirk, “Conservative vs. Liberal—A Debate,” New York Times, March 4, 1956. 
51 Ibid. 
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centralization of power would seem to erode the democratic individualism and democratic 
decentralization so important to Jeffersonian liberalism.  For Jefferson, this view of collaborative 
government and business was  antithetical to grassroots democracy. 
 Thus, the acceptance of a revised Hamiltonian philosophy, in economic and 
governmental policy, when combined with the democratic liberalism of Jeffersonianism, 
constituted the core of progressive ideology at the turn of the century.  However, instead of 
mass-movements advocating for greater political autonomy and reform, the increasingly 
powerful federal government was the vehicle for Jeffersonian ends but it had to achieve these  
through Hamiltonian means.  Progressivism, therefore, was  an ideology that was  Hamiltonian 
but for Jeffersonian ends; such a philosophy was best articulated by the successors of the 
progressive movement—Franklin Roosevelt and the New Dealers.52  And with the rise of the 
New Deal, Franklin Roosevelt tried to present himself as an heir to Jefferson’s liberal tradition 
and attach Jefferson to the New Deal.53  The New Dealers, evolved progressives, cast themselves 
as the defenders of the new “four freedoms” and strongly promoted the political liberalism of 
Thomas Jefferson—increased democratic reforms on behalf of the majority. 
 In progressive thought, one can see the union between the political liberalism of Thomas 
Jefferson and the amended economic and governmental conservatism and nationalism of 
Alexander Hamilton.  But even within the progressive movement, there was a division along the 
same Jeffersonian-Hamiltonian grounds.  The more conservative and nationalist tradition, 
centered upon Theodore Roosevelt and the Republican Party, was still largely laissez-faire in its 
approach to economics and largely remains so today.  The other wing was a revised liberal 
progressivism, still tacitly anti-capitalist in the Jeffersonian liberal tradition, which reached its 
                                                          
52 Ellis, 8-9. 
53 Ibid., 9. 
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premature prominence under Woodrow Wilson54 who, like Jefferson, also promoted a strong 
internationalism that would ultimately undo his Presidency and destroy the liberal progressive 
movement in the 1920 election.  The success of the New Dealers lay  in their merger of these two 
progressive schools for the prospective collective betterment of the nation as a whole, or the 
“social-utilitarian end of the state,” which the New Dealers had strongly identified as having 
deeper roots in Jeffersonian democracy moreover than in  Hamiltonianism.55 
However, one of the most prominent areas of conflict in progressive thinking was (and is) 
concerned with trade policy.  Liberals had always promoted free trade; free trade was a core 
ideal in Jefferson’s program, as it naturally benefitted the consumer and hurt large corporate 
interests.  Trade would also prevent the rise of unnecessary industry in the United States.  
Conservatives always  tended to  support high tariffs and other barriers to trade, which hurt the 
underclass consumer but greatly benefitted the capitalist class.  From Hamilton to Croly, 
protectionism carried the day in  conservative trade policy because it naturally benefited large 
corporate interests, but for liberal progressives like Woodrow Wilson, who saw high tariffs in the 
same light as  Jefferson, as “a means of building up and maintaining [the] vested interests” of the 
capitalist class,56 he promptly reduced the tariff as president (with the passing of the 
“Underwood-Simmons Tariff”). 
Indeed, even today we see a division within the progressivism of the Democratic Party 
concerning free trade, with the majority of Democrats, who hail from the corporate Hamiltonian 
regions of the country—the West coast and Northeast—standing in opposition to free trade.57  
                                                          
54 Wiltse, 259. 
55 Wiltse, 238. 
56 Ibid. 
57 See Jeff Taylor, Where Did the Party Go?  William Jennings Bryan, Hubert Humphrey, and the Jeffersonian 
Legacy (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2006), who argues that the later Democratic Party (post-William 
Jennings Bryan) has evolved from the original progressive position, “Hamiltonian for Jeffersonian ends,” into a 
party that has subconsciously become “Hamiltonian for Hamiltonian ends.”  He also asserts that the conservative 
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The rift among the more Jeffersonian progressive school and the Hamiltonian school still 
underscores a division within progressive thinking after the dissolution of the New Deal coalition 
after 1968.  Jefferson’s promotion of international free trade, , is also a medium under which 
libertarians continue to extol Thomas Jefferson, although for different reasons than they 
advocate.  Erstwhile “liberals” have reshaped the trade debate to imply “fair trade” and the 
protection of high tariffs, which have historically helped corporations concentrate wealth and 




 The great question of American Progressivism is whether  two seemingly oppositional 
philosophies, that of Jefferson and that of Hamilton, co-exist?  Will one philosophy come to 
supersede the other?  The rise of progressivism saw it necessary to combine, in the words of 
Herbert Croly, the ideas that were “right” in Jefferson and the ideas that were “right” in 
Hamilton.58  But Croly favored a greater degree of Hamilton than Jefferson.  The genesis of 
American Progressivism is much less “radical” and liberal than many realize.  It is a philosophy 
of the radical center, seeking to counterbalance conservative economic policies that would breed 
too much material inequality without proper safeguards from an activist government, with liberal 
political reformism, while also rejecting the anti-democratic and Hobbesian tendencies on which  
Hamiltonianism was originally founded .  Indeed, many who subscribe to the banner of 
                                                          
and libertarian populist traditions that have emerged after World War II have common ground with liberal populists 
in the more authentic Jeffersonian tradition than with mainstream conservatives, and the same is true for liberal 
populists having more commonality with conservative populists than with modern progressives. 
58 Croly, 29. 
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progressivism have more in common with liberal populism than turn of the century 
progressivism and by that extension, modern progressivism. 
 While progressivism took some inspiration from Jefferson, and later progressive leaders 
like Franklin Roosevelt and the New Dealers claimed Jefferson as their own, progressivism 
ironically sealed the decline of Jeffersonian liberalism within the Democratic Party.  Although 
the initial nexus of progressive thinking—the union of government and business acting in 
collusion together for the benefit of the common worker—the philosophy trended Hamiltonian as 
time progressed, ultimately marking one of the final blows against Jeffersonian liberalism.59  
While progressivism still speaks the language of Jefferson, the results have been very far from 
his.  As Joseph Ellis says, the Jeffersonian appeal by modern progressives is but an aspect of a 
growing “illusion” in the American political tradition that has both Left and Right, trying to 
claim proper inheritance from Jefferson.60  Yet the language of Thomas Jefferson still resonates 
with modern progressivism and is evidence of that the allure of Jefferson, nearly two hundred 
years after his death, still holds much power in the American public conscience. 
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